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Interpreting Public Interest Provisions in International
Investment Treaties
Alison Giest

Abstract
Investor-state arbitral provisions are incorporated into various bilateral and multilateral
investment agreements, providing foreign investors means to recover from host states when
investment expectations change. There is debate on the merits and harms of these investment
arbitral provisions, some of which surrounds the provisions’ effects on public interest regulation.
Vague treaty language has led to inconsistent arbitral outcomes and a chilling effect on public
interest regulation. Despite attempting to improve health or environmental conditions, states may
be vulnerable to large amounts of liability in international arbitration. How much regulatory
liberty do the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, North American Free Trade Agreement,
and Trans-Pacific Partnership each provide to states? After arguing that the regulatory liberty is
insufficient, this Comment considers various strategies for increasing state regulatory capacity,
concluding that a good-faith inquiry tied to international norms would provide for a better balance
between state and investor interests.
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I. I NTRODUCTIO N
International investment law protects foreign investments from state action
through thousands of international bilateral and multi-state treaties.1 These treaties
allow multinational corporations or individual investors to recover from countries
when their investment expectations decrease due to domestic regulatory and legal
changes, arguably enabling greater economic growth and foreign direct
investment.2 With aspects of both public international law and private commercial
arbitration underlying the field,3 the international investment regime struggles to
provide a consistent body of law.4 The treatment of national regulation in
international investment treaty language exemplifies this tension. Regulatory
language has evolved in recent years, as drafters attempt to strike a balance
between foreign investors’ expectations and host countries’ desire to regulate
without exposure to liability. This Comment analyzes treaty interpretations that
reconcile these competing interests, looking specifically at various iterations of the
U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty and the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Countries bind themselves to the possibility of investor-state settlement and
arbitration through various multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs), such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),5 bilateral investment treaties
(BITs), and bilateral trade treaties. Disputes may arise as countries regulate to
advance “essential security and the public order, human rights, sustainable
economic growth, environmental protection, social and labour standards, cultural
policy and the capacity to respond to situations of economic emergencies.”6
Where two countries are party to a treaty, an investor from Country A who invests
in Country B can bring a claim against Country B when changes in Country B’s
regulatory environment negatively affect the investment. Over 3,000 agreements7
strengthen investor rights through investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)
provisions.8 As of 2014, there have been over 500 formal disputes between
1

Aikaterini Titi, The Right to Regulate in International Investment Law, in 10 STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 19–21 (2014).

2

Stephan W. Schill, Enhancing International Investment Law’s Legitimacy: Conceptual and Methodological
Foundations of a New Public Law Approach, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 57, 62 (2011); Chiara Coppotelli, InvestorState Adjudication Mechanism Negotiations in the TTIP: An Unpopular Endeavor into the Potential Politicization
of Dispute Settlement, 39 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1355, 1357–58 (2016).

3

Titi, supra note 1, at 29.
See Schill, supra note 2, at 58.

4
5

David Dayen, The Big Problem With the Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Super Court That We’re Not Talking
About, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/AZ6A-X5L7.

6
7

Titi, supra note 1, at 19.
Dayen, supra note 5.

8

ISDS is the umbrella term for these disputes.
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investors and states, with an increase in recent years as more investment treaties
are signed.9
Recently, international investment law has faced abundant public and
academic criticism, much of which stems from its interference with states’ right
to regulate.10 As tribunals provide investors greater opportunities to recover, states
will naturally regulate less for fear of liability. Scholars have speculated that this
phenomenon has spawned a “legitimacy crisis” where countries may exit
investment treaties.11 Developments in recent BITs and FTAs attempt to tackle
these growing concerns with text that recognizes states’ ability to regulate in the
public interest domain.12 The U.S. Model BIT and Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP) texts would seem to restore regulatory sovereignty to the states,
but interpretive concerns provide insight into the continuing tension between
investors and states in international investment law.13
The U.S. Model BIT serves as the template for U.S. investment treaties, and
is crucial to understanding any U.S. investment provision. There have been several
iterations of the Model, which will be further discussed in Section IV. In 2004,
officials made significant changes by limiting the types of claims that investors
could bring, introducing statutes of limitations, and clarifications of the definition
of investment.14 Despite increased criticism of the Model BIT and BITs generally,
there were few material changes between the 2004 and 2012 versions.15 The 2012
version served as a model for the investment provision in the TPP. 16 The TPP
was a draft multilateral trade treaty being negotiated among Australia, Brunei,
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the U.S.
and Vietnam17 that set rules to “regulate about one-third of global trade and
investment.”18 The TPP’s draft investment provisions were leaked last year. While
9

10
11
12
13

14

Susan D. Franck & Lindsey E. Wylie, Predicting Outcomes in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 65 DUKE L.J.
459, 463 (2015).
Titi, supra note 1, at 32–33.
Schill, supra note 2, at 29.
Titi, supra note 1, at 24–26.
See id. at 35–37 (describing the competing concerns as a line drawing problem where it is unclear
how to distinguish “between the right to regulate and limitations on treaty’s investment
protections”).
Lise Johnson, The 2012 U.S. Model BIT and What the Changes (or Lack Thereof) Suggest About Future
Investment Treaties, 8 POL. RISK INS. NEWSL., No. 2, Nov. 2012, https://perma.cc/X2D3-4TZ5, at
1–2.

15

See Mark Kantor, Little Has Changed in the New US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 27 ICSID REVIEW
335, 378 (2012).

16
17

Id.
Titi, supra, note 1, at 61.

18

Sergio Puig, The Merging of International Trade and Investment Law, 33 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2015).
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there is an emphasis in the language on the right to regulate in the public interest
domain,19 the TPP investment language falls victim to many of the criticisms of
other treaties’ investment provisions. The U.S. withdrew from the treaty prior to
ratification, limiting the scope of the liability that the TPP would have yielded. 20
However, its language would be similar to that incorporated in other investment
and trade treaties.
TPP negotiations over investment provisions sparked significant criticism
and debate because of the increased amount of liability for regulating that the
countries would face.21 Some countries ensured that they would be exempt from
the TPP’s ISDS provision.22 And while one treaty, like the TPP, would not alter
international investment law greatly because of the large number of treaties already
in existence,23 the criticism of the TPP reflects the negative perception of ISDS
generally. Without rectifying the system, ISDS will continue to face criticism. The
evolution of the U.S. Model BIT and drafting of the TPP reflect some of the most
current thinking regarding investments and regulation. Both will be discussed in
Sections IV and V.
This Comment proposes that clarity in future public interest provisions
would provide stability for states, and produce no greater harm to investors than
the treatment that domestic corporations receive or that multinational
corporations face in their own states. Given recent criticism and increased
transparency in international investment law, there is reason to think that arbitral
tribunals would be receptive to interpretive guidance. Additionally, uniformly
reading in a good-faith requirement with respect to state regulation, and putting
the burden on investors to prove bad faith, would provide greater clarity for states,
investors, and tribunals.
Section II proceeds by briefly describing the background of international
investment agreements, highlighting the benefits and criticisms of the system and
establishing the need to rectify investment law procedure, as opposed to
eliminating investor-state dispute mechanisms. Section III explains how public
interest exceptions for state liability have been incorporated into treaty language,
and proceeds in Sections IV and V by showing how public interest exceptions
19
20

21
22

23

See Titi, supra note 1, at 26.
See Kevin Granville, What is TPP? Behind the Trade Deal That Died, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 23, 2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-explained-what-is-trans-pacificpartnership.html?_r=1.
See Franck, supra note 9, at 464.
Andrew Stephenson & Lee Carroll, The Investment Treaty Arbitration Review, The Trans-Pacific
Partnership, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/K6FB-6VJV.
See Todd N. Tucker, Creeping Multilateralism, TODD N. TUCKER: UNDER TWO CEILINGS (Apr. 30,
2015), https://perma.cc/A5Q7-JXS4 (“But if the past pacts continue to exist, then investors could
pluck the most pro-investor provisions from a country’s entire roster of treaties. Such use of [the
most-favored nation clause] sharply diminishes the utility of treaty-by-treaty reform efforts.”).

Summer 2017

325

Chicago Journal of International Law

have evolved in the U.S. Model BIT, NAFTA, and the TPP. After establishing
that the most current treaties provide insufficient guidance to tribunals, Section
VI describes several proposed solutions. Finally, the Comment concludes by
emphasizing the importance of interpretive guidance and a good-faith
requirement.

II. I NTERNATIONAL I NVESTMENT A GREEMENTS
A. Background of International Investment Agreements
Prior to the growth of BITs, investor disputes were resolved either by
domestic courts or by the investor’s home country, which would negotiate the
matter on behalf of the investor with the host state. Conversely, BITs and FTAs
govern modern investment disputes where the investor is a party to the dispute
against the host state.24 BITs developed after World War II by countries to protect
the investments of their nationals in other countries. The number of BITs grew
exponentially during the 1990s, following recommendations by the U.N. and the
proliferation of neoliberalism as part of a global strategy to increase investment in
developing countries.25 Arbitration offered protection for investors who were
skeptical about the reliability of property rights in developing countries. 26
Countries signed many BITs before the growth of the robust investor-state
industry that exists today, and may not have been aware of the liability risk they
had opened themselves up to for some time.27 Today, international investment
treaties and arbitration occur all over the globe, with investment flowing to
developing and developed countries. Over 90 percent of BITs include investorstate arbitration as the means for resolving investor-state disputes.28 The transition
from state-state negotiation to state-investor arbitration shifted power away from
states and toward investors and arbitrators.29
The components of each BIT are key to understanding the scope of potential
liability. Each BIT includes definitions, delineation of substantive rights, and a
preamble that may guide interpretation of the substantive rights.30 Substantive
rights include: (1) fair and equitable treatment that “sets a minimum standard of

24

Schill, supra note 2, at 73–74.

25

See Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 93 NEB. L. REV. 313, 315
(2014).

26

Schill, supra note 2, at 63.
Katselas, supra note 2525, at 326–29.

27

29

Id. at 324.
See Schill supra note 2, at 74.

30

Coppotelli, supra note 2, at 1364.

28
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treatment of all foreign investors,”31 including things like legitimate expectations
and due process;32 (2) “most favored nation” clauses that prevent a host country
from favoring one country over another;33 (3) a national treatment standard
providing that foreign investments cannot be treated worse than domestic ones;34
(4) umbrella clauses providing investors a cause of action in contractual claims
against governments, in addition to instances where an investor is able to make a
claim against the state because of its regulation;35 and (5) “full protection and
security,” which protects investors from expropriation.36 An investor can claim
violations of multiple substantive rights, depending on the particular facts of the
case, in hopes of recovering under at least one. Additionally, there are a number
of arbitral bodies with various rules, and each treaty designates which body
considers its claims.37 Some treaties may be more favorable to a specific claim than
others.38 Since countries are oftentimes parties to multiple treaties, an investor can
choose under which treaty they want to bring a claim.39
31

Meredith Wilensky, Reconciling International Investment Law and Climate Change Policy: Potential Liability
for Climate Measures Under the Trans-Pacific Partnership, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10683, 10685 (2015).

32

Coppotelli, supra note 2, at 1369–70.
See Wilensky, supra note 31, at 10685. Even if a country adopts a more “state-friendly” international
investment provision, an investor can insist on more investor-friendly treatment if the state gives
such treatment to another country’s investors in other treaties. Todd Tucker, The TPP Has a Provision
Many Will Love to Hate: ISDS. What is it, and Why Does it Matter?, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2015)
https://perma.cc/5UQG-YHWS. Often the most-favored nation provision implies an “in like
circumstances” test where the tribunal is to decide if the measure is legitimate based on how a
different investor would be treated under the same circumstances. See Titi, supra note 1, at 143.

33

34
35

See Wilensky, supra note 31, at 10685.
Titi, supra note 1, at 48.

36

Coppotelli, supra note 2, at 1364, 1375 (Explaining that a breach of contract may only be
expropriation if the state was acting in a sovereign, not a commercial, capacity.).

37

Arbitration bodies include: the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes of the
World Bank (ICSID), the London Court of International Arbitration, the International Chamber
of Commerce, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre, and ad hoc panels set up under
the U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules. Claire Provost
& Matt Kennard, The Obscure Legal System That Lets Corporations Sue Countries, THE GUARDIAN (June
10, 2015), https://perma.cc/DUC6-KCWT.

38

Odysseas Repousis, Multiple Investment Treaties Between the Same States?: The Case of the ECT, KLUWER
ARBITRATION BLOG (Apr. 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/RKU7-DUWQ. For example, an energy
investor might have the option of bringing a claim under a relevant BIT or the Energy Charter
Treaty (ECT), both of which have investor-state arbitration clauses. Unless the drafters have
accounted for which treaty takes precedence, an investor can choose to bring a claim under either
treaty, likely one of the BITs in this instance that is more favorable to its claim.

39

Concerns over treaty-shopping are exacerbated by the low bar to being considered an investor in a
particular country. Qualifying as an investor in a country may require “registration” in a country or,
in some cases, “substantial business presence” in one’s designated home country. WILLIAM STRENG
& JESWALD SALACUSE, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS PLANNING: LAW AND TAXATION VOL. 2 § 10.06
(2015). Where an investor from Country A wants to invest in Country B, but no treaty exists to
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Despite having generated over 500 disputes, decisions of arbitral tribunals
are non-binding on future cases. This leads to legal ambiguity. Further, there are
inconsistencies between case outcomes even within the same fora.40 That being
said, panels often reference earlier arbitral decisions, creating something of
persuasive precedent. Panels often publish awards, but publish the full opinions
less often.41 Empirical evidence suggests that arbitral bodies rely more on their
prior decisions than on the language of the particular treaty at hand, further
obfuscating the legal standards.42 This could suggest that the language of the treaty
may not be particularly meaningful––whether or not there is explicit denunciation
of public interest regulation. But it could also suggest that, even if some treaties
have not incorporated public interest exceptions, arbitral tribunals may be able to
consider public interest ramifications where relevant.
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes of the
World Bank (ICSID) is one of the most common arbitral fora included in BIT
treaties, arbitrating claims over matters such as pollution regulation, expropriation
of property and oil reserves, and minimum wage increases.43 ICSID is also a
convention that 150 states have signed.44 With so many countries, it is a credible
institution and source of authority in international law.45 However, there is no
centralized body that governs investment disputes, ICSID or otherwise, aside
from limited appellate review.46 Thus, arbitrators have leeway to consider (or
ignore) public interest goals, free from formal oversight.

protect its investment, the investor might structure its investment through Country C where
Countries B and C have a favorable BIT. Julien Chaisse, The Treaty Shopping Practice: Corporate
Structuring and Restructuring to Gain Access to Investment Treaties and Arbitration, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
225, 247 (2015).
40

See CAROLINE HENCKELS, PROPORTIONALITY AND DEFERENCE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION:
BALANCING INVESTMENT PROTECTION AND REGULATORY AUTONOMY 3 (2015).

41

Schill supra note 2, at 80.
See Schill supra note 2, at 82.

42
43

See Gary Hufbauer, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in ASSESSING THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP,
PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 109, 115 (2016).

44

Katselas, supra note 25, at 331.
See id. at 330–31.

45
46

Id. at 322 (noting that, in fact, an attempt to do so in the 1990’s called the Multilateral Agreement
on Investment (MAI) failed.); Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, in TRANSPACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: AN ASSESSMENT, 209 (Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs & Jeffrey J. Schott eds.,
2015) (explaining that the ICSID Convention limits appellate review to egregious departures from
procedure and corruption.).
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B. Benefits of Internat ional Investment Agreements
International arbitral tribunals provide neutrality and efficiency that
supporters of the current system claim states would be incapable of providing on
their own.47 Without tribunals, there is concern that investors would be stuck
vindicating their claims in biased local courts that do not resolve claims with
sufficient speed. While treaties vary slightly, the tribunals largely offer a uniform
system of rules for investors to navigate, no matter which country they invest in.48
With this stability, investors secure investments in the event of material changes
like the nationalization of resources.49 Developing countries may be able to attract
more investment when foreign investors are ensured that they will not be treated
less favorably than local companies.50 In some instances, developing countries
might not otherwise be able to attract necessary financing.51 Some empirical
research suggests that BITs, and specifically those that do not require domestic
resolution first,52 attract more investment.53 Prior to international investment
agreements, investors were left with limited recourse for harm to their
investments. As an alternative, investments were priced differently, investors
requested support from their home state, or they simply accepted the loss.54

C. Criticism of International Investment Agreements
Tension within the current international investment law system is apparent
as countries denounce the ICSID convention, exit BITs, amend BITs, and issue
interpretive statements.55 There has been widespread criticism from a variety of
perspectives––criticism of the tribunals’ interpretations, the lack of
transparency/accountability, pro-investor bias, and lost state sovereignty––

47
48
49
50

Id. at 324.
Schill, supra note 2, at 63.
Provost & Kennard, supra note 37.
Hufbauer, supra note 43, at 109.

51

Jane E. Cross, Foreign Investment Laws in Developing Countries: Effective Industrial Policy?, 6 MICH. Y.B.
INT’L LEGAL STUD. 155, 171 (1984).

52

Some treaties require the dispute be litigated in domestic courts prior to moving to international
arbitrators. This approach would be less favored by investors, as it would be more time consuming
and costly, with a lower likelihood of recovery early on. Thus, there is a trend that removes this
requirement in ISDS provisions.

53

54

The Hon. Charles N. Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What's in a Meme? The Truth about Investor-State
Arbitration: Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 689,
708 (2013).
See Franck & Wylie, supra note 9, at 471.

55

See Katselas, supra note 25, at 318.
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leading to what some scholars have called the “public law challenge.”56 Recently,
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela denounced ICSID completely; Ecuador has
terminated some of its BITs; last year, India either renegotiated their BITs or
insisted on joint interpretative statements in an attempt to rein in the interpretive
power of tribunals.57 In countries that have rejected the ICSID convention, there
seems to have been a decrease in foreign investment,58 but this could also be due
to a host of other factors (including the fact that there has been a change to the
system, leaving a wake of legal uncertainty). This Comment assumes that the
benefits of international investment treaties outweigh the costs of total rejection
of the system, and thus focuses on potential reforms.
Many states have expressed dissatisfaction with the wide “interpretative
powers” of investment tribunals that stem from the ambiguous protections
provided for in the treaties.59 The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development’s
(UNCTAD) World Investment Report criticized inconsistent readings of key
provisions in international investment agreements and poor treaty interpretation.60
In addition to the fact that there is no binding precedent to provide clarity in
international investment law, the tribunals “continue to generate inconsistent
interpretations of the same standards of investment protection and differing
conclusions as to state liability in relation to cases with identical or similar fact
situations.”61 Incoherent decisions make it difficult for both states and investors
to conform their behavior to international law.62 This has been thought to also
reduce the amount of public welfare regulation overall.63 Interpretive concerns
will be elaborated in Section III.
The system lacks transparency leading to both a lack of precedent for parties
to follow and a lack of accountability.64 Nongovernmental organizations have
focused much of their criticism here.65 Proceedings are largely confidential,
56

Stephan W. Schill, The Public Law Challenge: Killing or Rethinking International Investment Law?, COLUM.
FDI PERSP. No. 58, Jan. 30, 2012.

57

Titi, supra note 1, at 23; Kavaljit Singh & Burghard Ilge, India Overhauls its Investment Treaty Regime,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Jul. 15, 2016), LEXIS ACADEMIC; See Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs,
Ecuador: 2016 Investment Climate Statements, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (July 5, 2016),
https://perma.cc/QCY6-RNVB.

58

Brower & Blanchard, supra note 53, at 764–65.
Schill supra note 2, at 66.

59
60

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report: Reforming
International Investment Governance 145, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2015 (June 24, 2015).

61

HENCKELS, supra note 40, at 3.
Id.

62

64

Id.
Provost & Kennard, supra note 37.

65

See Schill, supra note 2, at 66.

63
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making it difficult to establish a line of precedent to guide behavior.66 And unlike
most national courts, there is no legislative balance of power.67
There is criticism of inherent pro-investor bias68 stemming from the
historical lack of regard for public welfare in the language of investment treaties.69
The appearance (and quite possibly the reality) of this bias, compounded by the
structural/procedural issues like uncapped awards and the finality of arbitration
decisions with only a limited system for appeal or review, increases the proinvestor bias sentiment.70 Nonparties cannot participate in these confidential
proceedings, even if they are to be affected by the outcome of the tribunal
decision.71
Given the uncertainty and potential bias, states regulate less—diminishing
their sovereignty. When a country is forced to make policy changes in the interest
of its citizens, they may be vulnerable to claims if foreign investments are affected,
even if local investments would not be protected. The standards for bringing a
successful investor-state dispute claim are lower than they are in most domestic
contexts.72

D. The “Public Law Challe nge”
Because of the historical lack of regard for nonparties and the public in
arbitral decisions, the criticism of investor-state dispute settlement has been
termed the “public law challenge.”73 International investment arbitration is neither
wholly private arbitration nor public law, but some combination of both.74 In
commercial, contract-based arbitration the parties are viewed by arbiters as equals;
if one party breaches the contract, that party is liable.75 This intuition is often
mapped onto international investment arbitration between states and parties, even
though the consent to arbitrate based on treaty rules is more attenuated than it
would be in a commercial dispute because “the investor acts upon an opportunity

66

Schill, supra note 2, at 67.

67

Katselas, supra note 25, at 331.
Brower & Blanchard, supra note 53, at 711.

68
69
70
71
72

Schill, supra note 2, at 67.
Provost & Kennard, supra note 37.
Schill, supra note 2, at, 64.
See Katselas, supra note 25, at 331.

74

Schill, supra note 2, at 67.
Schill, supra note 2, at 59.

75

See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 124 (2007).

73
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provided by an earlier inter-state bargain.”76 This has been called “arbitration
without privity.”77
A public law perspective requires horizontal equality between the two states,
not the investor and a state.78 The state should be able to exercise authority over
its own affairs,79 in pursuit of “democracy, equal treatment, separation of powers,
legal certainty and predictability, or in other words, the rule of law.”80 The issues
that these investor disputes involve (that is, regulation) are areas typically handled
by public law (i.e., the government).81 And certainly, the decisions that arbitrators
come to, despite criticism that they can be incoherent, are an exercise of public
authority, as they shape behavior in ways atypical of traditional commercial
arbitration.82 Professor Stephan Schill argues that instead of blending the features
of private and public law in a way that is inherently conflicting, we should adopt
an international public law framework that protects other constituencies, in
addition to the state itself and foreign investors.83 Schill suggests strengthening the
international arbitration system by incorporating best practices from domestic
contexts as a way to increase the legitimacy of investor-state dispute resolution.
Domestic courts are already suited to deal with questions such as due process and
expropriation.84 Schill’s solution will be discussed later in this Comment, but for
now, it serves as a helpful framework for understanding the complexity of
international investment law.

E. Exiting International Investment Treaties
The investor-state dispute resolution system requires procedural and
substantive changes to address the growing criticism. For example, procedurally,
there have been attempts to increase transparency. ICSID now publishes at least
some excerpts of legal reasoning in its decisions, increasing accountability and
transparency.85 UNCITRAL’s recent Transparency Rules require all decisions to
be published.86 These are merely several examples of changes that address
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

Id. at 126.
Schill, supra note 2, at 77.
VAN HARTEN, supra note 75, at 131.
See id.
Schill, supra note 2, at 67.
Id. at 76.
See id. at 79.
Id. at 59.

85

See id. at 60.
Brower, supra note 53, at 717.

86

Id.

84
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procedural flaws. Further improvements would likely increase the legitimacy of
the tribunals themselves, but are beyond the scope of this Comment.87
Before discussing these changes, it is important to note that it is difficult to
exit investment treaties. When it is possible, countries lose the benefits of
participation in the investor-state resolution system. It takes six months to exit the
ICSID Convention, but a state still remains a party to each BIT that it has signed. 88
There is typically a waiting period in each BIT whereby a country must wait a
specified number of years before exiting the treaty.89 And even where this does
occur, most BITs include “survival clauses” where matters can continue to be
arbitrated for ten to twenty years if they occurred while the treaty was effective. 90
Thus, a country must exit all BIT agreements and wait until the end of all “survival
clauses” to no longer be vulnerable to claims. Further, given the benefits, this
Comment assumes that countries should stay in their agreements and improve
them, as opposed to exiting the investor-state dispute resolution system
altogether.

III. P UBLIC I NTEREST E XCEPTIONS
A. How Public Interest Exceptions Are Incorporated Into
Treaties and Their Interpretation
It is generally acknowledged that states need to be given some freedom for
public interest regulation. In fact, the first BIT between Germany and Pakistan in
1959 included security, public health, and morality exceptions to the mostfavored-nation substantive right.91 This Section will demonstrate the difficulty of
defining what regulation in the public interest means, and elaborate on how the
exception is captured in treaty language. Before expanding on this, it is important
to consider why states should be exempt from compensating investors in certain
instances.
Many scholars would suggest that ordinary regulatory activity should exempt
countries from liability under the substantive standards.92 And thus, public interest

87

88
89
90
91
92

The UNCTAD World Investment Report suggested “improving the impartiality and quality of
arbitrators” and recommended “assisting developing countries in handling [investment dispute]
cases.” supra note 60.
Katselas, supra note 25, at 338.
Id.
Id. at 339.
Titi, supra note 1, at 53.
Id. at 33–34. Alternatively, some argue that while there is a right to regulate, it does not forgive a
country of its obligation to compensate. But because a compensation requirement would deter
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exceptions are incorporated into treaties to reduce taxpayer liability when the
regulation is intended to benefit the public and prevent the chilling of such
regulation.93 For example, taxation on tobacco might decrease an investor’s
expectation by reducing demand for the product. But where the tax is necessary
for health purposes, should taxpayers be expected to compensate the investor?
This Comment and many scholars assume the answer is no. There is a justification
for such an assumption in takings law. Without extensive review of U.S. takings
law, the government is not expected to compensate an individual when the
regulation is designed to prevent a public nuisance.94 Compensation is due
generally only when the entire value of property has been reduced from the
regulation, which is a high bar for a plaintiff to meet.95 Further, domestic investors
are protected less than foreign investors covered by investor-state arbitration
treaties because there is not domestic recovery for public interest or non-public
interest regulation.96 Scholars have considered linkages between U.S. takings law
and international investment standards, and while this analysis is outside our
scope, takings law and its limits on compensation embody the need for
unconstrained public interest regulation.97
At a basic level, public interest regulation is “regulation with a basis other
than a state of necessity, national security or the public order.”98 This Comment
considers how to define or interpret the public interest or ordinary regulatory
regulation, this Comment assumes that without forgiveness of liability, the right to regulate could
not exist.
93

94

95

96

97

98

Aaron Cosbey, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 and the Environment: A Discussion Paper for the CEC’s Public
Workshop on NAFTA’s Chapter 11, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
(Mar. 24, 2003), https://perma.cc/KE5W-G6RT.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992) (holding that a regulatory
taking has not occurred when a regulation does “no more than duplicate the result that could have
been achieved in the courts.”).
See id. at 1030 (“When, however, a regulation that declares “off-limits” all economically productive
or beneficial uses of land goes beyond what the relevant background principles would dictate,
compensation must be paid to sustain it.”); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A Inc., 543 U.S. 528, 528–530
(2005) (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)) (rejecting a
regulatory takings test that assessed the extent to which a regulation advanced legitimate state
interest, in favor of the Penn Central test that inquiries into the “economic impact on the claimant,”
“distinct investment-backed expectations,” and “the character of the government action”).
See Vicki Been & Joel Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and the
Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 31 (2003).
See id. There might be an argument that international investors need special protection given that
they are not a part of the domestic political process, as a domestic tobacco producer would be.
However, an international firm can garner domestic political support in the same way that a
domestic firm can, and in neither case does the corporation itself have the ability to vote—it must
influence the political process through alternate means.
Titi, supra note 1, at 101.
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activity. Metalclad99 provides an example of the difficulties that this presents. The
tribunal in that case interpreted NAFTA’s fair and equitable treatment provision
and determined that the public interest was not sufficient to overcome indirect
expropriation by Mexico.100 Initially, Mexico granted the Mexican company
Coterin permission to build a hazardous waste facility. The company was sold to
Metalclad, a Delaware company. The local government, with the appropriate
national authority to deny such construction, later prohibited Metalclad from
constructing the facility after protests. The local government designated the site
as a “Natural Area for the protection of cactus.”101 The tribunal found against
Mexico, ruling that it had denied Metalclad a “predictable framework” for
planning its investment, thereby violating Article 1105(1) because Metalclad had
relied on the representations made to Coterin by the Mexican government.102
Metalclad successfully argued that Mexico failed to provide requisite clarity about
the licensing process based on provisions in NAFTA that call for transparency.103
They found that because Metalclad had invested a significant amount into
construction, denying the permit constituted an indirect expropriation.104 This
appears to be an overly broad characterization of investment expectation because
it required a level of transparency between local and national government above
that which is typically required in international law.105 Later interpretations have
been limited as such.106 And in this case, Mexico petitioned for review by the
Supreme Court of British Columbia, a limited body of arbitral review. The court
rejected the tribunal’s ruling in part—deciding that the level of transparency must
be understood in light of international law’s deference to a country’s right to
regulate, but upholding the indirect expropriation because it was not “patently
unreasonable,” and Mexico had previously been satisfied with the level of
environmental protection when they provided an initial permit.107 This case
illuminates the conflict over public interest regulation. On a textual level, it is
possible to frame the municipal permit denial as either reasonable or unreasonable
public interest regulation. The arbitral proceedings highlight several problems.
99
100

101
102
103
104
105
106
107

See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 ILM 36 (2001).
Gustavo Vega & Gilbert R. Winham, The Role of NAFTA Dispute Settlement in the Management of
Canadian, Mexican, and U.S. Trade and Investment Relations, 28 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 651, 690 (2002).
Metalclad, supra note 99, at 44. See also Vega, supra note 100, at 690.
Metalclad, supra note 99, at 50.
Vega, supra note 100, at 690.
Metalclad, supra note 99, at 50.
See Titi, supra note 1, at 238: see also Vega, supra note 100, at 701–704.
See Cross, supra note 51, at 162–65 (reconsidering NAFTA and the U.S. Model BIT).
United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp. (2001), 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359 (Can. B.C. Sup. Ct.), at ¶¶ 68,
70, 72, 76, 99, 100, 134.
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The deferential review of arbitral decisions is concerning, as is the lack flexibility
for states to adjust their laws to changing circumstances.
There is a generally accepted exception in international law for “bona fide”
regulation that causes economic harm.108 However, the frequency with which
tribunals make such inquiries is not totally clear; nor is it clear if the inquiry is
made by tribunals in a consistent way.109 One might term these “bona fide” public
interest regulations as those with a legitimate purpose. Despite increased
recognition that host states should have some right to regulate,110 most BITs are
vague with regard to what is legitimate, leaving little guidance for tribunals as to
how to weigh competing state and investor interests and to what extent the state’s
interest should be scrutinized. For example, the E.U.’s characterization of
legitimate regulation as “public health, safety, environment, public morals, and the
promotion and protection of cultural diversity”111 is quite vague. Various treaties
create their own lists of values that are within the public interest.112 But how much
can a regulation protect the environment? What makes protecting cacti a valid
justification for denying a hazardous waste facility? How many cacti make it a
worthy interest? A list of values is of limited use without guidance on how to
define the terms.
When public interest exceptions are rejected by tribunals, governments may
be left paying large amounts of money in awards or settlements, and/or the public
left without beneficial policies.113 For example, in Vattenfall v. Germany,114
Vattenfall, a Swedish corporation, claimed that the new water quality standards
made their coal-fired power plant “uneconomical.”115 The claim was for over one
billion dollars, but it settled “when the government agreed to watered-down
standards.”116 Prospectively, governments may avoid regulating with the prospect
of arbitration. For example, scholars suggest that Canada did not adopt tobacco
plain packaging laws to avoid arbitration.117 Having established a need to regulate,

108

HENCKELS, supra note 40, at 7.

109

See id.
Titi, supra note 1, at 58.

110
111
112

Hufbauer, supra note 43, at 118.
See Titi, supra note 1, at 101.

113

Wilensky, supra note 31, at 10684 (“In practice, these payments may make regulatory measures costprohibitive, especially in an era marked by austerity.”).

114

See Vattenfall AB v. Federal Republic of Germany, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6, Request for
Arbitration (2009).

115
116

Wilensky, supra note 31, at 10684 (citing Vattenfall, supra note 114, at 12).
Id. at 10685.

117

See id.
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the next three subsections explore how public interest exceptions are incorporated
into treaties.

1. Public interest exceptions can take the form of obligations.
Positive regulatory language can be either obligatory or declaratory in nature.
Neither create a “legally enforceable right” to regulate per se, but signals to
tribunals the intentions of the party states.118 The Belgium-Luxembourg
Economic Union (BLEU)-Mauritius BIT (2005), for example, provides for
explicit environmental obligations: “each Contracting Party shall strive to ensure
that its legislation provide for high levels of environmental protection and shall
strive to continue to improve this legislation.”119 This type of language does not,
however, force a tribunal to weigh the public interest against that of the investor,
whose rights are still the main focus of the treaty. Likewise, some BITs have
expressed positive obligations for companies to abide by, like corporate social
responsibility norms that require corporations to behave in ways that account for
the public and/or the environment. But there is no direct cause of action against
either the investor or the state for not complying, and the obligations of the state
to work toward better public interest protections can only indirectly be considered
in a tribunal when looking at an investor-state dispute. Arguably, these norms
would be better exemplified in legislation (as opposed to investment treaties).120

2. Public interest exceptions can be declaratory in nature.
The second type of positive language, declaratory rights to regulate, may
provide some signaling to tribunals, but is also substantively toothless. Norway’s
Draft Model BIT for example states that “[n]othing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure
otherwise consistent with this Agreement that it considers appropriate to ensure that
investment activity is undertaken in a manner sensitive to health, safety or
environmental concerns.”121 While signaling some receptiveness to public interest
concerns, effectively, if a regulation is inconsistent with the treaty goals (for
example, investment protection), then it is not within the state’s authority to
regulate at the expense of investment.122 A drafting approach with more teeth can
be found in Article VIII of the UK-Colombian BIT: “Nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining, or enforcing any
118

Titi, supra note 1, at 10–15.

119

Id. at 106; Bilateral Investment Treaty, BLEU-Mauritius, art. 5(1), Nov. 30, 2005,
https://perma.cc/5GWF-T3D9.

120
121

See Titi, supra note 1, at 109–10.
Draft Model BIT, Norway, art. 12, 2007, https://perma.cc/U9D4-PBVD (emphasis added).

122

See Titi, supra note 1, at 112–13.
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measure that it considers appropriate . . . provided such that measures are nondiscriminatory and proportionate to the objectives sought.”123 Here, the
consideration for the public interest is unqualified, as it does not include
“otherwise consistent with this Agreement” language. But treaties with such
language are certainly in the minority.124

3. Public interest exceptions can be incorporated into the preamble of
a treaty.
While the language does not directly provide a right, incorporating the
language in a preamble serves an interpretative purpose stemming from the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).125 Some models state that
“investment protection is to be realised without compromising public policy
objectives.”126 Where there is language on regulation in the preamble, the tribunals
may be more likely to weigh the public interest more carefully. Despite the VCLT,
tribunals have often given more interpretive power to preambles than other
regulatory provisions in investment treaties.127

IV. E VOLUTION OF THE U.S. M ODEL B ILATERAL T REATY
This Section and the next demonstrate the evolution of public interest
language in the U.S. Model Bilateral Trade Agreement (U.S. Model BIT) and the
Trans-Pacific Partnership. Both treaties incorporate public interest concerns using
all three methods described above. The chosen language theoretically guides states
as they regulate, companies as they invest, and tribunals as they assess whether a
given regulation is in conformity with the treaty.
Change in the U.S. Model BIT reflects increased concern for regulation.128
The U.S. Model BIT is a template for investment treaties between the U.S. and
other countries. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has the freedom to
adjust the model, but any negotiated BIT needs two-thirds Senate approval.129 The
1984 Model BIT and treaties based on it were more investor-friendly because of
inclusion of things like the umbrella clause that give investors the opportunity to
123

Id. at 114.

124

See id. (“A more daring exception . . .”)
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
See Titi, supra note 1, at 116.

125

126
127
128

129

See id. at 122.
See id. at 69. Investors brought claims against the U.S. several times in the 1990s, sparking interest
in treaty language adjustments.
Fact Sheet: Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Office of the United States Trade Representative (Apr.
2012), https://perma.cc/56WY-WMFK.
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recover for contract disputes with states, in addition to instances where they can
recover for regulatory change.130 The preamble of the 1984 version included no
public interest recognition, nor did any specific provisions provide for protection
of the environment, labor, or any other public interest.131
The 2004 iteration provided preamble language recognizing for the first time
that investment goals should be met “in a manner consistent with the protection
of health, safety, and the environment, and the promotion of internationally
recognized labor rights.”132 Interestingly, labor rights are tied to international
standards, but other interests are not tied to any particular international or
domestic standard.133 Without tying the right to a particular protocol or standard,
the tribunal may be left in the dark with regard to how far a country can go in its
public interest regulation. The 2004 model also included the Investment and
Environment Article for the first time, recognizing that states should not lower
their domestic environmental standards as a means to acquire investment.134 This
prevents a state from weakening its environmental regulation, but does not
explicitly provide that the state should have an ability to heighten regulation. A
country that initially has low environmental standards may be vulnerable to claims
as it attempts to regulate in line with international environmental standards.
Reference to such standards would provide more freedom to regulate.135 Like the
Norway Draft mentioned in Section III, the new Article included a right to
regulate on behalf of the environment “otherwise consistent with this
agreement,”136 reducing virtually any right to regulate if it would negatively impact
a foreign investment. While this is recognized as a step forward, in that it
theoretically provides protection for environmental regulation, the language
remains vague and ineffective.137 Article 13 introduces a higher protection for
labor, but it is still vague.138 Countries cannot reduce their labor standards “in a
manner that weakens or reduces adherence to the internationally recognized labor

130
131

132

133
134

135

Titi, supra note 1, at 49.
See Text of the U.S. Model Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment of
February 24, 1984, 4 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 136, 136 (1986).
Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [country] Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2004),
https://perma.cc/W3K4-WDCB [hereinafter Model BIT (2004)] (emphasis added).
See id.
See id. at art. 12; ANDREAS KULICK, GLOBAL PUBLIC INTEREST AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW 70 (2012).
See KULICK, supra note 134 at 71.

137

2004 Model BIT, supra note 132, at art. 12.
See KULICK, supra note 134, at 71.

138

See id.
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rights.”139 Like the environmental provision, there is no explicit freedom to
heighten labor regulation in order to come into compliance with referenced
international norms. However, the second clause on “otherwise consistent”
regulation that exists in Article 12 on the environment is absent from Article 13
on labor. The clause circumscribes freedom to regulate environmental harms
where it is contrary to economic objectives, but labor regulation is not limited in
the same way. There was also language added in Annex B that did not appear in
the 1984 Model that attempts to clarify how public interest regulation relates to
expropriations: “Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions
by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare
objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute
indirect expropriation.”140 Theoretically, this removes the possibility that a
legitimate welfare-enhancing regulation will be classified as an expropriation. 141
However, it is unclear what the “rare circumstances” are that would constrict a
state’s freedom to regulate.
The 2012 Model contains a greater amount of positive language regarding a
right to regulate. However, it has been criticized as equally ambiguous as the 2004
Model.142 The preambular language from the 2004 Model remains, providing some
level of limited interpretive guidance. The language in Article 12 on the
environment is largely the same, but the 2012 Model adds positive language
recognizing the right143 that each state has to enact legislation “where a course of
action or inaction reflects a reasonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a
bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources.”144 While a more formal
right to regulate appears, it is qualified by ambiguous language like “reasonable
exercise.” And even with this apparent right, it is unclear if a right to regulate
forgives all ISDS liability or only mitigates it. There was also increased specificity
as to what “environment” means in the context of the treaty.145 However, the
139

2004 Model BIT, supra note 132, at art. 13.

140

Id. at Annex B (emphasis added).
See Titi, supra note 1, at 38.

141
142
143

144
145

See id. at 300; 2004 Model BIT, supra note 132.
See Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [country] Concerning
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (2012),
https://perma.cc/9LWZ-LTBR [hereinafter Model BIT (2012)] (“the right to exercise discretion
with regard to regulatory, compliance, and investigatory matters”).
Titi, supra note 1, at 107; 2012 Model BIT, supra note 143, at art. 12(3) (emphasis added).
2012 Model BIT, supra note 143, at art. 12(4). The 2012 Model BIT provided:
the primary purpose of which is the protection of the environment, or the
prevention of a danger to human, animal, or plant life or health, through the:
(a)
prevention, abatement, or control of the release, discharge, or emission
of pollutants or environmental contaminants;
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“otherwise consistent with this Treaty” language still qualifies the right to
regulate.146 Finally, there were some procedural additions providing for public
participation and consultations to resolve disputes in this Article.147 Article 7
requires “as appropriate . . . public participation.” It is ambiguous in not defining
“appropriate,” and in not clarifying how failing to follow the procedural
requirements would bear on liability and recovery. Presumably, the language is
included to give the public an opportunity to voice concerns about the regulation
or the investment, but this is not explicit. Regarding Annex B on expropriation,
the language is identical to that which was included in the 2004 Model meaning
that “non-discriminatory” public welfare regulation does not constitute
expropriation except in “rare circumstances.”148 Article 13 on labor remained
largely the same, but provides for the same procedural protections as Article 12.
There are additional provisions in the 2012 model that tilt the balance away
from a strong pro-investor bias. The new Model limits the scope of “investor.”
For example, Article 17 removes treaty protection for investments owned or
controlled by an investor from a country that is not a party to the treaty.149
Formerly, an investor aiming to recover could set up a subsidiary in a state party
to a favorable BIT.150 The 2012 Model removes the umbrella clause that extends
protection to investors in contract disputes.151 Some of the substantive rights have
been limited, which should theoretically make it more difficult to bring a claim
against a state that has made a legitimate regulation in the public interest. The fair
and equitable treatment provision and the full protection and security provision

146

(b)
control of environmentally hazardous or toxic chemicals, substances,
materials, and wastes, and the dissemination of information related thereto; or
(c)
protection or conservation of wild flora or fauna, including endangered
species, their habitat, and specially protected natural areas. Id.
Id. at art. 12(5) (“Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopting,
maintaining, or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Treaty that it considers
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental concerns.”).

147

Id. at art. 12(6)–(7) (“6. A Party may make a written request for consultations with the other Party
regarding any matter arising under this Article. The other Party shall respond to a request for
consultations within thirty days of receipt of such request. Thereafter, the Parties shall consult and
endeavor to reach a mutually satisfactory resolution. [ ] 7. The Parties confirm that each Party may,
as appropriate, provide opportunities for public participation regarding any matter arising under
this Article.”).

148

150

Id. at Annex B.
See id. at art. 17(1)–(2) (“A Party may deny the benefits of this Treaty to an investor of the other
Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to investments of that investor if the enterprise
has no substantial business activities in the territory of the other Party and persons of a non-Party,
or of the denying Party, own or control the enterprise.”).
Titi, supra note 1, at 49.
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Id.
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have been linked to the customary international law minimum standard of
treatment of aliens, meaning that a country does not owe an investor treatment
beyond that which is guaranteed by international law.152

V. F ROM THE N ORTH A MERICAN F REE T R ADE A GREEMENT
TO THE T RANS -P ACIFIC P ARTNERSHIP
This Section will start by comparing NAFTA and the TPP, two free trade
agreements that bring in more parties than a bilateral trade agreement and thus
increase potential arbitration. While the U.S. pulled out of the TPP after the 2016
General Election, the language in the TPP reflects current thinking about the
investment treaties and mirrors that of the U.S. Model BIT. Public interest
regulatory language was strengthened in the TPP draft compared to that in
NAFTA.
NAFTA, enacted in 1994, includes only three countries (the U.S., Mexico,
and Canada), whereas the TPP would have included Australia, Brunei, Canada,
Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the U.S. and
Vietnam.153 NAFTA led to a nearly 500 percent increase in foreign investment
among the member states.154
NAFTA includes reference to the public interest in its preamble, similar to
that of the 2004 and 2012 U.S. Model BITs, but it is even more specific.155
Theoretically, a tribunal might attribute greater weight to the public interest when
considering an investor’s claim because of the more specific language, a stronger
signal of intent. The TPP considers the promotion of labor, public welfare, and
the environment.156 And, interestingly, the treaty language provides for an explicit
“right to regulate” for environmental protection, public welfare, public morals,
152
153

See 2012 Model BIT, supra note 143, at art. 5.
Titi, supra note 1, at 61.

154

William L. Owen, Investment Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: A Threat to Sovereignty of Member
States?, 39 CAN.-U. S. L. J. 55, 56 (2014).

155

See North American Free Trade Agreement Preamble, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 298 (1993), Pub. L.
No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (“CREATE new employment
opportunities and improve working conditions and living standards in their respective territories;
UNDERTAKE each of the preceding in a manner consistent with environmental protection and
conservation; PRESERVE their flexibility to safeguard the public welfare; PROMOTE sustainable
development; STREGTHEN the development and enforcement of environmental law and
regulations; and PROTECT, enhance and enforce basic workers’ rights.”).
See Trans-Pacific Partnership Preamble, Feb. 4, 2016, https://perma.cc/YQK8-BA6S [hereinafter
TPP] (“PROMOTE high levels of environmental protection, including through effective
enforcement of environmental laws, and further the aims of sustainable development, including
through mutually supportive trade and environmental policies and practices; PROTECT and
enforce labour rights, improve working conditions and living standards, strengthen cooperation
and the Parties’ capacity on labour issues.”).
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and the adoption of healthcare systems.157 Neither the U.S. Model BITs nor
NAFTA included such specificity in their preambles. But despite robust language
in the preamble, it is difficult to imagine the tribunals would consider the
preambulatory language sufficient in and of itself to increase regard for the public
interest in arbitration, given their lack of general regard for treaty language.
While the language in NAFTA might lead one to think that there are multiple
carve-out provisions for the public interest, tribunals often interpret provisions in
such a way as to limit their application.158 NAFTA included vague language, similar
to that of the U.S. Model BITs, related to environmental protection, stating that
in order to benefit from these provisions’ protection, the measures must be
“otherwise consistent with this Chapter [11].”159 As a result, “Articles 1101 and
1114 have not effectively shielded many public interest measures, nor deterred
investors from bringing claims.”160 Commercial rights take precedence in the
wording of the carve-out.161 The TPP employs similarly preclusive language with
regard to the environment, public health, and regulation.162

157

158

See id. at Preamble (“RECOGNISE their inherent right to regulate and resolve to preserve the
flexibility of the Parties to set legislative and regulatory priorities, safeguard public welfare, and
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, the environment, the
conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources, the integrity and stability of the
financial system and public morals; RECOGNISE further their inherent right to adopt, maintain
or modify health care systems.”).
Cf. NAFTA, supra note 155, at art. 1101 (“4. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent
a Party from providing a service or performing a function such as law enforcement, correctional
services, income security or insurance, social security or insurance, social welfare, public education,
public training, health, and child care, in a manner that is not inconsistent with this Chapter.”) (emphasis
added).

159

NAFTA, supra note 155, at art. 1114 (“1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a
Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner
sensitive to environmental concerns. 2. The Parties recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety or environmental measures. Accordingly, a Party should not
waive or otherwise derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from, such measures as
an encouragement for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in its territory of an
investment of an investor. If a Party considers that another Party has offered such an
encouragement, it may request consultations with the other Party and the two Parties shall consult
with a view to avoiding any such encouragement.”) (emphasis added).
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Kathleen Cooper et al., Seeking a Regulatory Chill in Canada: The Dow Agrosciences NAFTA Chapter 11
Challenge to the Quebec Pesticides Management Code, 7 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVT’L. L. J. 5, 29 (2013).
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See id.
TPP, supra note 156, at art. 9.16 (“Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party
from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this Chapter that it
considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory is undertaken in a manner
sensitive to environmental, health or other regulatory objectives.”) (emphasis added).
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Cases suggest that tribunals inquire into the legitimacy of a regulation to
determine if it is in the public interest domain. The tribunal might look to
statements by the government to an investor or its own subjective determinations
on what an investor should expect in terms of regulation.163 However, in NAFTA,
this legitimacy determination weighs in favor of investor interest because “tribunal
members are required to interpret the rights granted to investors within Chapter
11 in the context of NAFTA’s objectives, which are purely commercial, set forth
in Article 102.”164 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires giving
greater weight to the purpose and objective of the treaty.165
The TPP language includes greater specificity than NAFTA with regard to
what is legitimate in its expropriation provision.166 If deemed an expropriation, the
state is required to compensate the investor, similar to takings law.167 Article 9.8(1)
of the TPP authorizes expropriation where there is a “public purpose,” with the
caveat that the taking be compensated.168 Takings and expropriation generally
require compensation if for a public purpose. But the focus here is on regulation
and indirect expropriation, where some, but not all of the investment expectation
may have decreased. The TPP incorporates language from the U.S. Model BIT
that states that indirect expropriation (that is, regulation) is not a taking when
“applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health,
safety and the environment . . . except in rare circumstances.”169 While this
improved upon NAFTA by theoretically limiting the instances where regulation
163

Cooper et al., supra note 160, at 31.
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Id. at 24; NAFTA, supra note 155, at art. 102 (“The objectives of this Agreement . . . are to: a)
eliminate barriers to trade in, facilitate the cross-border movement of goods and services between
territories of the Parties; b) promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area; c) increase
substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties; d) provide adequate and
effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in each Party’s territory; e)
create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this Agreement, for its joint
administration and the resolution of disputes; and f) establish a framework for further trilateral,
regional and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of this Agreement.”).
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Vienna Convention, supra note 125; Cooper et al., supra note 160, at 28. NAFTA includes adherence
to international law, presumably Vienna Convention interpretation, among its objectives. NAFTA,
supra note 155 at art. 102 (“The Parties shall interpret and apply the provisions of this Agreement
in the light of its objectives set out in paragraph 1 and in accordance with applicable rules of
international law.”).
See Wilensky, supra note 31, at 10686.
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See id.
TPP, supra note 156, at art. 9.8(1) (“No Party shall expropriate or nationalise a covered investment
either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalisation
(expropriation, except: (a) for a public purpose [footnote omitted]; (b) in a non-discriminatory
manner; (c) on payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation in accordance with
paragraphs 2, 3 and 4; and (d) in accordance with due process of law.”).
Id. at Annex 9-B(3)(b).
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could be deemed a taking, without providing more guidance as to what is
“legitimate” and what is “rare,” tribunals would have no more guidance than they
did under NAFTA.170 In fact, Australia refused to sign onto the investment
provision of the Agreement, even in light of the seemingly more state-favoring
language. Australia did not want to restrict its ability to regulate in environmental
and social areas.171
The ambiguous nature of “legitimate expectations” leads to a tendency for
states to settle in fear of tribunals interpreting in investors’ favor. NAFTA
decisions demonstrate that tribunals have largely interpreted these provisions in
ways favorable to investors. NAFTA’s text does not require dispositive scientific
evidence of instances of environmental harm or a clear guiding international
standard, but tribunals have required such evidence as a justification for economic
harm stemming from public interest regulation.172
In Dow AgroSciences v. Government of Canada,173 the Canadian government
defended its decisions to ban pesticides by invoking the precautionary principle.
Within this framework, a country may ban chemicals unless there is scientific
evidence that the chemicals are not harmful—a more cautious approach to the
unknown harms that could result from industrial developments.174 Dow rejected
this defense, calling it “political” in nature. While the case was settled, scholars
predict that the tribunal would have focused on Dow’s “legitimate expectations”

170

171
172
173

174

The TPP did provide some description for what constitutes legitimate public health regulation, by
ensuring that certain activities would never be considered takings. See TPP, supra note 156, at Annex
9-B & n. 37 (“For greater certainty and without limiting the scope of this subparagraph, regulatory
actions to protect public health include, among others, such measures with respect to the regulation,
pricing and supply of, and reimbursement for, pharmaceuticals (including biological products),
diagnostics, vaccines, medical devices, gene therapies and technologies, health-related aids and
appliances and blood and blood-related products.”)
Titi, supra note 1, at 46–47.
Cooper et al., supra note 160, at 43–44.
See Dow AgroSciences v. Gov’t of Can., NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Notice of Intent To Submit a
Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter Eleven of the North American Trade Agreement (Aug. 25,
2008), https://perma.cc/E8KS-8DPT; Cooper et al., supra note 160, at 31.
John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
13, 13 (2002). As Applegate indicates,
At its core, the precautionary principle embodies two fundamental regulatory
policies: anthropogenic harm to human health and the environment should be
avoided or minimized through anticipatory, preventive regulatory controls; and,
to accomplish this, activities and technologies whose environmental
consequences are uncertain but potentially serious should be restricted until the
uncertainty is largely resolved. It reflects the implicit judgment that, in the
absence of some degree of ex ante regulatory review, new technologies will
create novel, severe, and irreversible-but avoidable-harms to human health and
the environment. Id.
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with reference to “scientific studies and international guidelines, not measures
based on the precautionary principle.”175
In Ethyl Corp v. Government of Canada, the Canadian government settled
another ISDS claim related to a separate chemical ban, where there was a lack of
positive evidence regarding the chemical’s harms.176 Conversely, in Chemtura v.
Canada, the tribunal deferred to Canada’s environmental regulation, rejecting a
claim that the regulation violated NAFTA’s investment protection provisions
because there was positive evidence of scientific harm.177 The tribunal determined
that the government’s assessment was in accordance with international standards
and commitments, and that the chemical production at issue exceeded acceptable
health risk based on these standards.178 A precautionary principle approach would
not have required such extensive evidence. Countries have divergent views about
whether to apply a precautionary or reactionary approach to their developments. 179
The E.U., for example, includes reference to the principle in its general governing
treaty.180 However, in investment tribunals, because the text is ambiguous,
tribunals made normative judgments about the how to define “legitimate.”
Without clear textual guidance, in Methanex v. U.S., the tribunal rejected the
expropriation claim. It stated that when states enact environmental regulation in
good faith, investors should expect environmental regulation to change.181 This
suggests that arbitrators can be more lenient, even without guidance. On the one
hand, the state wins and the regulation is enacted; on the other hand, the lack of
textual guidance makes it difficult for parties to plan for the future, and may stifle
regulation when states are unsure if the regulation is “legitimate.” NAFTA and
later BITs allow for some public participation, like amici curiae statements, when
175

Cooper et al., supra note 160, at 43.

176

See Christina L. Beharry & Melinda E. Kuritzky, Going Green: Managing the Environment Through
International Arbitration, 30 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 383, 422 (2015); Ethyl Corp. v. Gov't of Can.,
NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction, (Jun. 24, 1998), https://perma.cc/78PA-6JN7.
See Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Canada, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Award, (Aug. 2, 2010),
https://perma.cc/96MG-JGA4; FACT SHEET: INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS),
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://perma.cc/7H9Y-EEP2.
Chemtura Corp., supra note 177, at 37–43.
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See, for example, Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 191(2), Jul. 6, 2016, 37
I.L.M. 67 (“Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into
account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the
precautionary principle and on the principles that preventive action should be taken, that
environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at source and that the polluter pay.”).
See id.
Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Final Award, (Aug. 3, 2005),
https://perma.cc/R9MP-UPAF; FACT SHEET: INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (ISDS),
supra note 177.
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the public interest is in question.182 But overall, the lack of clarity and seemingly
desultory decisions by tribunals demonstrate the need for a more coherent line of
persuasive precedent and guidance.

VI. R EFORMING T REATY T EXT AND A RBITR AL B ODIES
While there have been some drafting developments that should theoretically
give arbitrators more guidance as to the intent of the signatories (that the member
states want greater discretion to enact public interest regulation), the latest U.S.
Model BIT and the TPP still cabin public interest regulatory space and fail to
provide sufficient clarity for tribunals to follow. It would likely be difficult to
capture the necessary textual precision in a treaty, as norms change and countries
alter regulation accordingly. Even if this were possible, there would need to be
structural changes to ensure arbitrators actually interpreted the treaty at hand.
Dissemination of past decisions might fill in the gaps, but as discussed earlier,
tribunals appear simply to not be following their own former decisions in a
coherent way. Despite all the issues, one challenge stands out—how are arbitrators
to decide when a regulation is legitimate? This Section looks at several scholars’
observations and suggests that engaging in a good-faith inquiry is well within the
meaning of the treaties and would provide a sufficient filter to balance the needs
of investors and states.

A. Treaty Language Suggestions
There are language alternatives that would better reflect concern for public
interest regulation. The ideal treaty language that many critics favor would include
absolute exemptions for public interest regulation. This would require removing
the “otherwise consistent with this Charter” language that is present in Model
BITs, NAFTA, and the TPP.183 The following example will show that even with
very pro-state language, the tribunal will still need to engage in a good-faith inquiry
to ensure the regulation is legitimate.
Many critics have suggested Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) as the paradigm for a public interest exception.184 GATT is a
multilateral treaty with rules governing international trade.185 As such, it creates a
range of rights and obligations.186 GATT provides ten exemptions, which provide
182

Cooper et al., supra note 160, at 26.
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See Wilensky, supra note 31, at 10693.
See, for example, KULICK, supra note 134.
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See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, World Trade Organization, July 1986, 13.1
U.S.T.I.A. 184 [hereinafter GATT].

186

See KULICK, supra note 134, at 67.
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a higher level of guidance than most BITs. There are exemptions for public
morals; human, animal, or plant life or health; products of prison labor; protection
of national treasures or historic, artistic or archaeological value: conservation of
exhaustible resources; or regulations needed for the acquisition of distribution of
products in general or local short supply.187 Unlike the agreements discussed
above, it does not qualify the exemptions with “otherwise consistent” language.
To balance these public interest objectives with investor interests, GATT simply
prohibits “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.”188
Without the qualifying language, the tribunal is forced to engage in something like
a good-faith inquiry. But despite being offered as a paradigm, it is not without
criticism. The exemptions are “an extremely tough hurdle [for states] to clear,” 189
exacerbated by the fact that the burden is on the states to prove good faith.190
Norway’s legislature attempted a Draft Model BIT of its own with comparable
robust public interest protection language. It laid out a list of exemptions in the
preamble and provided commentary on its intentions including a desire for state
autonomy with regard to regulation.191 However, the draft was never ratified
because of polarizing criticism from the public, some suggesting there was
insufficient investor protection and others suggesting that there was insufficient
room to regulate.192 Norway’s failure suggests that states are not receptive to such
dramatic changes in language.193

B. Interpretive Solution
This Comment suggests that regardless of whether more precise language is
adopted, the inquiry will inevitably be the following: is the regulation legitimate?
Scholars have proposed several methodologies (discussed below) for answering
this general question, including engaging in comparative law analysis and
employing threshold inquiries into legitimate regulation. This Comment thus
proposes building on these methods, and employing a good-faith inquiry will
determine which regulations are legitimate and which are not.

187
188
189
190
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GATT, supra note 185.
Id.
See Cosbey, supra note 93, at 15–16.
Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International Investment and Domestic Health Protections—Is a General
Exceptions Clause a Forced Perspective?, 39 AM. J. L. & MED. 332, 359 (2013).
KULICK, supra note 134, at 73–74.
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Damon Vis-Dunbar, Norway Shelves its Draft Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, INV. TREATY NEWS (Jun.
8, 2009) https://perma.cc/9ESW-T5CH.
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See KULICK, supra note 134, at 75–76.
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1. Tribunals should consider relevant procedures for dispute
resolution across various countries.
Stephan Schill suggests that mapping a public law framework onto
international investment arbitration will strengthen the legitimacy of the system.194
He argues that engaging in comparative public law studies will provide guidance
for tribunals as they develop overarching principles for international investment
arbitration.195 He finds studies in comparative law particularly suitable because
arbitration closely parallels constitutional and administrative legal decision-making
at the domestic level.196 These systems also deal with vague standards, and as such,
should provide useful models for the vague standards in investment treaties. 197
The problem with Schill’s approach with regard to regulation is the varying
receptivity states have to regulation. When states have diverging regulations in
food labelling, for example, there is no correct answer as to what the right amount
of labelling is. States’ requirements vary based on people’s preferences for
information about genetically modified foods, hormones, and other attributes.
Thus, while domestic contexts may provide procedural guidance for how to deal
with competing investor rights and public interest regulation, they do not offer
substantive guidance for how to weigh claims in a uniform manner.

2. Tribunals should have limited discretion to balance public interests
and investor interests.
Andreas Kulick proposes applying a proportionality analysis that would
balance the rights of investors and the public interest.198 In his formula, more
regulation would qualify as “legitimate.” Arbitrator scrutiny should concern itself
most with three prongs: “(1) suitability; (2) necessity; and (3) proportionality stricto
sensu.” Under the first prong, the state only need prove that the regulation
“furthered the (legitimate) purpose as set by the government.”199 Second, the
necessity prong looks to whether there are alternative, less restrictive ways to
achieve said objective.200 This is stricter than the first prong because it can be
analyzed ex post and find liability when a government was wrong about the course
of action that it took. Third, proportionality stricto sensu evaluates how important
194
195
196
197

See generally Schill, supra note 2.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 86.
See id. at 89.

199

KULICK, supra note 134, at 170. Kulick justifies the application of the proportionality balancing
from the fact that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that general principles of
international law should be accounted for in BIT interpretation.
Id.

200

Id.

198
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the interest actually is and evaluates the means and ends. This type of analysis
raises serious questions about the level of scrutiny that should be applied by the
arbitral tribunals. Considerations might include “the gravity of the infringement”
by the state; legitimate expectations; “importance of the global public interest”;
whether or not the public interest assertion is a guise; and “importance of the
investor right.”201 Under a balancing approach, the compensation should not be
viewed as all or nothing; rather, compensation to the investor should be adjusted
based on these factors.202 The first two prongs are useful threshold inquiries that
a tribunal could engage in before considering the regulation further.
The third prong asks several questions that would be helpful in a good-faith
inquiry. Legitimate expectations (like explicit government statements that
regulation will stay a certain way) and whether the public interest is a guise would
both expose bad-faith regulations. However, the inquiries in the third prong that
require weighing the investor’s interest against the public interest are troublesome.
It will inevitably lead to normative judgments by the tribunal. Further, reducing
awards by the importance of the public interest might decrease legitimacy of the
investment arbitration system. Surely, being able to attach seemingly arbitrary
award numbers to global public interests would only exacerbate a system already
under scrutiny for being occult and incoherent. Thus, limiting the tribunal’s power
to balance the public interest and investor expectations should be a goal.

3. There should be some limit on the state’s ability to regulate.
Kulick recognized that there needs to be some limit on what a state can
regulate. This Comment proposes interpretive guidance and a reliance on
customary international norms as a means to determine whether regulation was
made in good faith, but will proceed by first establishing that it is possible to read
in a good-faith inquiry. The U.S. Model BIT (2012) includes an explicit good-faith
provision where authorities in both the state of the investor and the state in
violation would review the amount of “good faith” prior to formal arbitration, in
an attempt to limit investor claims.203 While this phrase is left out of other public
interest regulation exceptions, it would not be farfetched for it to be read in. The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties suggests that a treaty should be
interpreted in “good faith” (not to be confused with the good-faith inquiry that
the Comment proposes). It is reasonable to assume that the member states did
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not intend to have their regulatory powers severely infringed by BITs.204 And thus
an originalist interpretation may be useful, whereby greater weight is given to what
parties intended, as opposed to a strict textual interpretation of the treaties. The
extensive language on public interest regulation in the preambles of recent
agreements is also a good indicator of the intentions of the member states. The
“otherwise consistent with this treaty” language has been said to limit the
regulatory power of states.205 But given the broad language in the preambles of
the U.S. Model BIT (2012) and the TPP reflecting the desire to promote public
interest issues, it is reasonable to interpret protection of the environment, public
health, etc. as consistent with the treaty. When interpreted in this way, it is not
entirely clear what purpose the phrase serves, but it does not provide sufficient
justification to read in a strong investor bias.

VII. C ONCLUSION
Tribunals cannot be compelled to interpret in a certain way, outside the text
of the treaties. But there are reasons tribunals might be persuaded to interpret
provisions in a way more favorable to states if interpretive guidance were provided
by independent bodies. Given the amount of criticism that ISDS has received, if
the system itself has an interest in survival, arbitration bodies should be more
receptive to criticism of arbitrary decision-making. Additionally, arbitrators are
repeat players that have an interest in continuing to arbitrate. They have an interest
in interpreting treaties in a way that conforms to the public’s interpretation of
public interest values. While there are numerous theories on why tribunal
decisions vary, increased interpretative guidance should provide a framework for
arbitrators to base their decisions on the intent of the member states, not the
subjective opinions of the arbitrators.
There should additionally be a presumption of legitimate regulation where
the regulation mirrors that of international norms. Given the ambiguity in treaties,
perhaps it makes sense to give the benefit of the doubt to the state, who actually
signed the treaty. This might include putting the burden of proof for proving the
regulation was made in bad faith on the investor. For instance, while the ICSID
tribunal rejected the precautionary principle in Chemtura and required positive
evidence of environmental harm,206 international custom might have led the
tribunal to require more evidence from Chemtura that their chemicals were not
harmful before rejecting the legitimacy of the regulation. The precautionary
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principle has been an emerging custom in international law since the Rio
Declaration on the Environment and Development in 1992.207 If there is reason
to think that a certain practice may cause harm to health, safety, or the
environment, when the state invokes regulation, the investor would have the
burden of proof in showing there is no danger. Despite the reference to domestic
laws in various BITs, including the U.S. Model BIT, it would be more than
reasonable for countries to exert their right to regulate when it is in line with
international law norms. Protections are already in place to avoid discriminatory
and arbitrary action. Thus, the investor’s burden would be a tougher hurdle when
the state’s regulation, or precaution, was not in line with international norms.
Further, it has been suggested that the precautionary principle would provide
guidance stabilizing tribunal decisions.208
It is possible that giving greater deference to the state will lead to less foreign
investment in the short term.209 However, as it stands, the current investment
arbitration system creates an inherent contradiction in international law––creating
treaties that aim to reduce greenhouse gases for example, yet simultaneously
burdening countries that try to make progress. Linking legitimate regulation to
international norms should provide the needed stability for both states and
investors that the system currently lacks. Regulation that dramatically shifted
overnight would seem less legitimate than a more gradual approach that mirrored
regulations in other countries. While it is likely that disputes over what
international norms are would arise, it would provide a much stronger baseline
than the current framework.
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Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, art. 15, Jun. 24, 1992, UN Doc A/CONF48/
14, 11 ILM 1416 [hereinafter Rio Declaration] (“In order to protect the environment, the
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